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Reflections on Monell's Analysis of the
Legislative History of § 1983
Robert J. Kaczorowski
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law;
J.D., New York University, 1982;
Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1971;
M.A., DePaul University, 1967;
B.S.C., Loyola University, 1960.

IN 1978, THE SUPREME COURT IN Monell v. Department of Social Ser-

vices' reversed Monroe v. Pape,2 decided only seventeen years earlier,
"insofar as [Monroe held] that local governments are wholly immune
from suit under § 1983."1 Monell purported to ground its reversal of
Monroe on the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
was originally enacted as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 187 1.4 However, rather than the debates relating to § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act
("1871 Act"), Monell based its analysis of the legislative history of §
1983 on the issues relating to an amendment introduced very late in
the debates by Senator John Sherman of Ohio, the so called Sherman
Amendment.
Monell gave two reasons for focusing its legislative history discussion on the debates relating to the Sherman Amendment rather than the
debates relating to section 1 of the 1871 Act itself. The Monell Court
explained that "The sole basis for [Monroe's] conclusion was an inference drawn from Congress' rejection of the 'Sherman Amendment' to
the bill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the precursor of §
1983."1 The second reason, which Monell repeated several times, is
that "there is virtually no discussion of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act" in
the debates. 6 After reviewing the legislative history, Monell concluded
that "nothing said in debate on the Sherman Amendment would have
prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 of the Civil Rights
Act for its own violations of the FourteenthAmendment. '7 Indeed, Monell declared: "This debate shows conclusively that the constitutional
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
436 U.S. at 663.
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (1871).
436 U.S. at 664.
Id. at 692 n.57.
Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
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objections raised against the Sherman amendment--on which our holding in Monroe was based, . . . would not have prohibited congressional
creation of a civil remedy against state municipal corporations that
infringed federal rights."8 Then, more affirmatively, Monell declared:
"Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and
other local government units to be included among those persons whom
§ 1983 applies."9 The Court also concluded that "the language of §
1983, read against the background of the same legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be
held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort."' 0 That is, Congress did not intend
to impose liability on a municipality "solely because it employs a tortfeasor-in other words, a local government cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."'
After reviewing the same legislative history, I find that Monell made
a number of factual and interpretive errors. First, there was abundant
discussion of both the meaning and the constitutionality of section 1 of
the 1871 Act. Second, during the Sherman Amendment debates, arguments were made that would "have prohibited congressional creation
of a civil remedy against state municipal corporations that infringed
federal rights."' 2 Third, the evidence supporting the conclusion that
Congress intended municipal corporations to be sued under what is now
§ 1983 is far from compelling. Fourth, I find nothing in the debates to
support the Court's conclusion that Congress intended not to hold municipalities vicariously liable for the actions of their officials. To the
contrary, the evidence suggests that, to the extent that municipalities
were liable at all, they might also have been vicariously liable for the
actions of their agents and employees.
I. The Sherman Amendment: Federal Liability for the
Wrongs of Strangers
Because both Monroe and Monell emphasized the Sherman Amendment, I will focus on its legislative history. Before I do, however, it is
8. Id. at 669.
9. Id. at 690 (emphasis added). In the cite which I omitted here, the Court softened
its assertion in the text, stating: "There is certainly no constitutional impediment to
municipal liability." Id. at n.54. It then declared that the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments were not impediments to municipal liability, citing twentieth century Supreme
Court precedents as authority.
10. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 659.
12. Id. at 669.
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necessary to point out that the 1871 Act represented Congress' attempt
to provide federal protection against the terrorism and violence of the
Ku Klux Klan. 3 The Klan during Reconstruction was not a unified
organization under a centralized structure of command. Rather, the term
referred to groups organized at the local level that shared common
purposes and common tactics: subjugating Southern Blacks and driving
out Southern white Republicans through the use of terrorism, violence,
and other forms of intimidation and harassment. The Klan thus constituted a paramilitary wing of the Democratic Party and white supremacists in the South. These organizations were analogous to guerrilla
forces fighting a rear-guard action, extending the Civil War beyond
Appomattox.14 The 1871 Act, like the other Reconstruction statutes and
constitutional amendments, were Republican measures adopted to protect Southern Blacks and white Republicans from violence and intimidation committed by Democrats and white supremacists which reduced
areas of the South to a state of anarchy and continuing civil war. The
provisions of the 1871 statute were intended to provide criminal penalties and civil remedies against individuals who participated in this
violence and intimidation.
A. The Original Sherman Amendment: Imposing
Strict Liability Directly on Local Property
Owners
The Sherman Amendment went through three versions. As originally
proposed, it imposed liability on "the inhabitants of the county, city, or
parish" in which property was damaged and personal injuries inflicted
by mobs or riots.' 5 It provided for the recovery of a judgment from the
property of inhabitants, but it permitted the municipality to sue the
perpetrators for "the full amount of such judgment, costs, and interest"
paid by inhabitants.
It is significant that the predicate for liability under the original Sherman Amendment was mere residence in the community in which an
13. The best history of the Ku Klux Klan during Reconstruction is ALLEN W.
THE Ku KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RE-

TRELEASE, WITE TERROR:

CONSTRUCTION (1971).

14. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876
(1985).

15. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 468 (1871). This provision also provided
that the violators must have intended to deprive the victim of a "right conferred upon
him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to deter him or punish him
for exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." Id.
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outrage occurred. 16 It did not impose liability on inhabitants for the
injuries they inflicted. Rather, it imposed liability for injuries inflicted
by others. Consequently, liability did not derive from tort principles of
liability or from agency theories of vicarious liability. Moreover, inhabitants of the community were held strictly liable for any property
damage and personal injuries that resulted from mob action. It mattered
not whether they attempted to assist the victim or to prevent the violence. They were still liable as members of the community in which
the violence occurred. Traditional tort principles of culpability or fault
were not involved. Nor was liability imposed on inhabitants through
an agency theory of vicarious liability, because their liability did not
derive from the actions of anyone with whom they had any relationship.
Liability was imposed merely because they owned property in the community in which riotous mobs violated someone's constitutional rights.
The Senate adopted the Sherman Amendment without debate, but
the House rejected it, also without debate. According to Senator Sherman, the House rejected it because many Republicans feared that, because the execution of a judgment could "be served upon the property
of any one," through selective execution, a judgment "might be made
the means of oppression."' 17 "The great moving cause in the House for
rejecting the first proposition," Sherman elaborated, was that "a loyal
man who was innocent entirely of the particular outrage might be selected" by Southern officials for execution of the judgment and thus be
8
made "the victim.'
B. The First Conference Substitute: Imposing Strict
Liability Directly on Municipalities
After the House rejected the original Sherman Amendment, a Committee of Conference drafted a substitute which provided that, instead
of suing the inhabitants of the community, a plaintiff was to bring a
civil action against the county, city, or parish in which the riot occurred,
although the actual rioters and anyone who assisted them could also be
sued in the same action.' 9 Moreover, the judgment itself was made a
lien "upon all moneys in the treasury of such county, city, or parish, as
16. Note that it was possible that one could be an absentee property owner, not a
resident, and still be liable for judgment under an assessment levied against the property
within the municipality. Also, one might be a renter and a resident and not be directly
liable for a property tax assessment. Nevertheless, the framers equated property ownership with residence in the community. For the purposes of this article, I will do the

same.
17. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 822 (1871) (Sen. Sherman).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 749.
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upon the other property thereof." However, the municipality was subrogated to all of the plaintiff's rights under the judgment against the
actual perpetrators of the crime. The substitute bill also authorized the
municipal corporation to proceed against anyone who, in the municipality's judgment, was a party or accessory to the misconduct. The first
conference substitute thus created all the means to redress and reim20
burse the county and to shift liability to the responsible parties.
It is significant to note again that the first conference substitute, like
the original Sherman Amendment, did not impose liability on municipalities for injuries caused by their own actions, or those of their employees and agents. Rather, municipalities were made strictly liable for
2
the wrongs of strangers that were committed within their jurisdictions. '
It is not surprising, therefore, that Monell concluded that "the constitutional objections raised against the Sherman Amendment ...would

not have prohibited congressional creation of a civil remedy against
state municipal corporations" for their own infringements of federal
rights.

22

C. The Second Conference Substitute: Imposing
Liabilityfor Negligent or Willful Breach of a
FederalDuty to Protect
Most of the legislative debates relating to the Sherman Amendment
focused on the first conference substitute. However, the House also
rejected this alternative to the original amendment. The final version
23
of the Sherman Amendment was adopted as section 6 of the 1871 Act.
20. Id. at 756 (Sen. Edmunds).
21. Professor Jack M. Beermann makes a persuasive argument that the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment is weak evidence that supporters of the Sherman Amendment rejected municipal vicarious liability. He perceptively observes that "the arguments made in Congress against the Sherman Amendment were not arguments against
municipal liability generally but were, rather, arguments directed at particular perceived
problems with the Sherman Amendment." The primary problems Beermann identifies
were the "constitutional and federalism objections to imposing liability on municipalities for the conduct of third parties." The Sherman Amendment, and arguments made
for and against it, did not address municipal liability for their, and their agents', own
civil rights violations. Jack M. Beermann, Municipal Responsibilityfor Constitutional
Torts, DEPAuL L. REV. at 8 (forthcoming) (draft on file with the author). As Beermann
notes, the Sherman Amendment did not impose liability on municipalities for their own
actions or actions of their employees. Rather, it imposed "liability for the actions of
non-employees not acting on behalf of the municipality." Id. at 31. He correctly concludes that "Expecting a municipality to prevent its employees from violating federal
rights is quite different from placing upon a municipality the obligation to prevent
private citizens from engaging in riotous conduct." Id. at 30. Moreover, he also notes
that the rejection of the Sherman Amendment "was not, as the Court has claimed,
particularly resounding." Id. at 8.
22. Monell, 436 U.S. at 669.
23. Section 6 is presently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
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This second conference substitute differed markedly from the first two
drafts in two respects. This version imposed liability on any person or
persons, not only townspeople, who could have prevented injury but
failed to do so. In other words, it substituted liability on a tort principle
of fault for strict liability, and it did not restrict liability to the municipality, or its residents, in which the wrongs were committed. It provided
that any person or persons who knew of conspiracies to commit wrongs
prohibited by section 2 of the 1871 Statute, and had the power to prevent or aid in preventing their commission, but failed to do so, shall
be liable to the person injured for all damages caused by the wrongful
acts, which the first-named person or persons could have prevented by
reasonable diligence. Section 2, inter alia, imposed civil, as well as
criminal, liability on anyone who conspired to injure, or who injured
another's person or property pursuant to a conspiracy to deprive him
of the equal protection of the law and of equal civil rights, or because
24
of race.
II. Legislative Purposes of the Sherman Amendment
Although the Sherman Amendment went through three versions, its
purpose remained the same. Supporters stated that they intended to
coerce local property owners to stop the mob violence by shifting the
cost of that violence from the victims to the property owners of the
community in which the damage was inflicted. As Representative Kerr
observed: "The practical effect of [these anti-riot statutes] was to make
each citizen a conservator of the peace, a sort of bailiff, to aid the public
authorities in maintaining the law. '25 Monell acknowledged this objective and asserted: "The first justification ... for statutes like the Sher26
man Amendment.. . 'is to secure a more perfect police regulation."'
The Court identified this as the only objective.
The proponent's purposes, however, included more than effective
law enforcement. Senator Sherman and Republican leaders in the
House and Senate expressed the belief that, if the costs of Klan violence
were shifted from the victims to the property owners of the communities in which these crimes were connitted, the local community leaders would sway public opinion against the violence. 27 As was charac24. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, § 2 (1871). Section 2 is presently
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
25. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1871) (Rep. Kerr).
26. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 777
(1871) (Sen. Frelinghuysen)).
27. Sherman declared: "Let the people of property in the southern States understand
that if they will not make the hue and cry and take the necessary steps to put down
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teristic of nineteenth century Americans, Sherman and his colleagues
believed that the wealthier property owners of the community could
stop the violence with their social leadership if they chose to do so.
28
Republican supporters were trying to induce them to make this choice.
They expected to spur community leaders into action and to influence
public opinion against the Ku Klux Klan.
Another objective was to compensate the victims of Klan violence.
It should be noted that the 1871 bill already provided civil damages for
the violation of constitutional rights. Section 1, of course, imposes civil
liability on any person who, under color of law, "shall subject, or cause
to be subjected" anyone to the deprivation of any right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States. 29 Furthermore, section 2
imposed civil, as well as criminal, liability on anyone who conspired
to, or who injured another's person or property pursuant to a conspiracy
to deprive him of the equal protection of the law and of equal civil
rights, or because of race.30 Consequently, anyone who participated in
these acts of violence, and any public official who contributed to the
injuries either actively or through inaction, who could be sued under
the Sherman Amendment, was already subject to suit under the first
two sections of the Klan Bill. The Sherman Amendment was thus an
additional and different provision that added the municipality's property owners as sources of compensation to the victims of Klan violence.
The first conference substitute added the municipality itself to the inhabitants as an additional source of compensation. The third version,
which Congress ultimately enacted into law, added anyone who had
knowledge of conspiracies to violate the other provisions and had the
power to prevent, or assist in preventing, their occurrence and failed to
do so. In short, the Sherman Amendment, in all its permutations, diflawless violence in those States, their property will be holden responsible, and the
effect will be most wholesome." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 761 (1871) (Sen.
Sherman).
28. If property holders will not do it; if, as in the southern States the propertyholders will lay there quiet on their farms and see these outrages go on day by day; if
property-holders will shut their doors when they hear the Ku Klux riding by to burn
and slaughter; if they will not rise in their might, and, with the influence which property
always gives in my community, put down these lawless fellows, I say let them be
responsible.
Id. (Sen. Sherman). Representative Ben Butler of Massachusetts echoed these comments in the House: he declared that, when men of property understand "that their taxes
will be increased by Ku Kluxism, that moment they will come forward and put down
Ku Kluxism." Id. at 792 (Rep. Butler). See also id. at 822 (Sen. Sherman); id. at 756,
820, 821, 824 (Sen. Edmunds); id. at 751, 805 (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 772 (Rep.
Butler); id. at 804 (Rep. Poland).
29. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (1871).
30. Id. § 2.
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fered from § 1983, and the other civil and criminal provisions of the
1871 Act which imposed liability on wrongdoers for the wrongs they
committed, by imposing liability on persons who did not themselves
violate civil rights on an implied duty to protect against rights violations
31
committed by "strangers.
The reasons proponents offered in support of the Sherman Amendment reveal its scope and its theory of liability, which were decidedly
different from those of sections 1 and 2 of the 1871 Act. Representative
Luke Poland of Vermont, a member of the Committee of Conference,
explained that supporters of the Sherman Amendment believed that the
criminal penalties and civil remedies provided in section 2 were unenforceable. The near impossibility of identifying the wrongdoers was
one major obstacle to recovery and prosecution under section 2.32 Problems of proof were another obstacle. A third hurdle was the jury's
sympathy for defendants who might be sued under either sections 1 or
2. 3 3 Congressman Poland, along with Senators Sherman and Allen
Thurman of Ohio, denigrated these provisions as futile. Consequently,
proponents expressed the belief that the Sherman Amendment, in its
original form and in the first conference substitute, eliminated these
problems of identification and proof and largely neutralized the jury's
sympathy for defendants. To recover, the plaintiff merely had to show
injury and causation, that is, that the injury was the product of a "riotous
assemblage." As Representative Butler put it, it was intended to be "a
35
4
mutual insurance"3 against the community.
31. In an insightful analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, the codified version of the second
conference substitute, Professor Linda Fisher explains the origins of the duty to protect
that this provision imposes and persuasively argues for the continuing need to apply it
to combat racial hatred and discrimination. See Linda E. Fisher, Anatomy of an Affirmative Duty to Protect: 42 U.S.C. § 1986, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. (forthcoming
1999) (draft on file with the author).
32. "[I]t is said that these riots, these disorders, these injuries are committed by
persons who are unknown; that the person injured does not know who it was that did
the injury to him or to his property, and therefore it is impossible for him to maintain
a suit against him, because he does not know him, or know them." CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 793 (1871) (Rep. Poland).
33. Id. at 821 (Sen. Sherman).
34. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 792
(1871) (Rep. Butler)).
35. Note that there were additional advantages from a litigation perspective. The
bill made filing a civil suit easier, and it made recovering a judgment not only easier
but also more certain. It also transferred from the victim to the municipal corporation
the enormous difficulty of identifying the actual rioters and the risk of recovering from
them. The plaintiffs task of recovering a judgment thus was made infinitely easier.
Senator Sherman thought it would be easier because a suit against a municipality would
obviate the prejudice against plaintiffs that juries would feel in suits against individual
defendants who participated in the offenses. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 821
(1871) (Sen. Sherman). Instead of having to execute against the numerous individual
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A. Municipal Liability Under the First Conference
Substitute: Direct and Absolute
The first conference substitute, which imposed liability directly on the
municipality, was modeled on English and state anti-riot statutes. The
framers acknowledged that under the common law there was no obligation on cities, counties, and other municipal corporations to compensate the victims of injuries caused by mobs and riots. Rather, such
liability was imposed "by arbitrary enactment of statutes, affirmatory
law."'3 6 Nevertheless, English and state anti-riot statutes imposed liability on municipalities only if they breached their duty to protect. State
anti-riot statutes referred to in the debates imposed liability on municipalities only if local authorities had notice of the riot, time enough to
prevent it, the power to prevent it (either themselves or with the aid of
local citizens), but failed to prevent it. In other words, model statutes
limited municipal liability to principles of fault. In contrast, the first
conference substitute imposed liability on the municipality merely on
the fact that the proscribed injuries occurred within its jurisdiction,
without regard to fault.
In their objections to the first conference substitute, opponents emphasized the injustice of making municipalities strictly liable for injuries caused by mobs over which they had no control. Opponents seized
on the strict liability the first conference substitute imposed on municipalities in distinguishing it from English and state anti-riot statutes.
Senator Thurman, the Senate Minority Leader, made the most compreproperty owners of the community, plaintiff was able to execute against one party, the
municipal corporation, if he was unable to recover from any of the other named defendants within two months of judgment. The task of recovering from the property
owners was thus shifted to the municipality, which still could recover the judgment
more easily than the plaintiff through tax assessments. In addition, putting the liability
on individuals in the community through taxes met the House's concerns about this
becoming a weapon of oppression.
36. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 777 (1871) (Sen. Frelinghuysen). Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio acknowledged the statutory basis of municipal
liability in answer to Representative Charles Eldridge of Wisconsin who queried him,
on his theory of municipal liability, why the federal government was "not liable for
every act of outrage committed by the rebels during the entire war upon the Union
people of the localities where those things took place?" Shellabarger responded:
[Tihese liabilities of communities or subdivisions of a State for destruction by a mob
do not arise under the common law, but are completely and wholly statutory. And
there being no statutes creating liability on the part of the government of the United
States for wrongs done by a mob there exists no such liability. And the gentleman
will find in the New York case which I have cited, in the arguments of counsel....
a complete list of authorities showing that the liability is a creature of statute merely,
and cannot be extended beyond the statute.
Id. at 752 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger). The case to which Shellabarger referred to is
Darlington v. New York, 31 N.Y. 164 (1865).
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hensive critique of the first conference substitute. He observed that
English municipal liability statutes did not impose liability if the offender was discovered and arrested.3 7 The Sherman Amendment, by
contrast, imposed liability regardless of the good faith efforts the municipality and its inhabitants might have made to prevent the offenses,
to bring the offenders to justice, or to succeed in prosecuting them.38
In the House, Representative Poland also complained that the Sherman
Amendment imposed "absolute liability" on municipalities, thus distinguishing it from the old English riot statutes on the grounds that "liability [imposed by English riot statutes] was only a contingent liability
.... [T]here was no absolute liability fixed upon the community, upon
the county, or any municipality."3 9
Senator Thurman also contrasted the strict liability of the Sherman
Amendment with the principles of municipal liability for riots found in
state anti-riot statutes. State statutes, such as Maryland's and New
York's, he noted, were based on the municipality's breach of its duty
to protect, whereas the Sherman Amendment imposed liability regardless of any breach of such duty. The states did not impose municipal
liability unless the local authorities had notice of the riot, had time to
prevent it, had the ability to prevent it themselves or with their citizens,
4°
and failed to prevent it.
Under the Sherman Amendment, proof of
37. He also noted that they required the plaintiff to assert his claim to the municipality within seven days of the offense and, if necessary, to file his suit within three
months. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 770 (1871) (Sen.Thurman). See also id.
at 788 (Rep. Kerr).
38. Id. at 770 (Sen.Thurman).
39. Id. at 794 (Rep. Poland). Representative Charles Willard of Vermont, another
Republican, similarly complained: "We make, in fact, no provision whatever in this
[first conference substitute] for proving in court that there has been any default, any
denial, any neglect on the part of the county, city, town, or parish to give citizens the
full protection of the laws." Id. at 791.
40. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 770 (1871) (Sen.Thurman). See also id.
at 788 (Rep. Kerr); id. at 791 (Rep. Willard); id. at 792 (Rep. Butler); id. at 794 (Rep.
Poland); id. at 794 (Rep. Kelley). By contrast, the second conference substitute encompassed tort principles of fault and negligence, thus making recovery more difficult. See
id. at 804 (Rep. Poland); id. at 805 (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 820, 821 (Sen. Sherman);
id. at 821, 824 (Sen. Edmunds); id. at 822 (Sen. Thurman). Representative Michael
Kerr of Indiana, and others, argued from a policy perspective that even with a notice
provision a riot statute that imposed liability on counties would be unjust because of
the sheer size and sparse population of the typical rural county. He argued that:
[S]ome counties of this country are almost as large as the whole of that island from
which we get our common law, and that many of our counties are very sparsely
settled; that the people are engaged in agricultural employments, and live remote
from each other; that these combinations of two or three persons to commit crimes
against one or more of the citizens of a county may be originated and executed
without any possibility that one other human being in the county or parish shall
know anything about the intent or the execution. There is, therefore, a total and
absolute absence of notice, constructive or implied, within any decent limits of law
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notice was not required in order to impose liability on the municipality.

Thurman insisted that "the theory upon which a municipality or a
county is to be made liable" under state anti-riot statutes "is that the
county has been derelict in its duty in preserving the rights of person
or of property" and for no other reason "it is punished by being made
liable for damages." 4 ' There was no such theory in the first conference
substitute, Thurman thundered:
No sir; the county may have performed its duty to the utmost; it may have the best
offices in the world; it may have the most law abiding people in the world; it may
have a population the most disposed of any in the world to protect every man in his
rights; and yet it may be liable under this bill. Nay, more, it may have seized the
men who committed the crime, may have confined them, may have put them in the
penitentiary of the State for the crime, and yet it is to be liable for damages. 42

Representative Michael Kerr of Indiana, House Minority Leader,
similarly complained: "It is arbitrarily and defiantly assumed that they
know it, and are, therefore, guilty. '43 Kerr insisted that this
monstrous and outrageous [provision] punishes the innocent for the guilty. It takes
the property of one and gives it to another by mere force, without right, in the absence
of guilt or knowledge, or the possibility of either. It violates all principles of law. It
is in full keeping with the incurably vicious character of this entire measure. 4

For Kerr and his Democratic colleagues, this was not law but sheer
force. In light of this evidence, Monell's conclusion that the first conference substitute encompassed a fault theory of municipal liability is
clearly erroneous.
Monell also concluded that, in rejecting the first conference substitute, the framers rejected a species of vicarious liability. It is on the
basis of this conclusion that Monell held that the framers of § 1983
intended it not to impose vicarious liability on municipalities. However,
this conclusion is also contradicted by the evidence. Like the original
and final versions of the Sherman Amendment, the first conference
substitute did not predicate municipal liability on a theory of vicarious
or reason. And the bill itself is significantly silent on the subject of notice to these
counties and parishes or cities. Under this section it is not required before liability
shall attach ... upon the municipality ....

It is arbitrarily and defiantly assumed

that they know it, and are, therefore, guilty. Considering the condition of our country,
the habits and pursuits of the people, I say this is simply monstrous and outrageous.
It punishes the innocent for the guilty. It takes the property of one and gives it to
another by mere force, without any right, in the absence of guilt or knowledge, or
the possibility of either. It is in full keeping with the incurably vicious character of
this entire measure.
Id. at 788.
41. Id. at 770 (Sen. Thurman).
42. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 771 (1871) (Sen.Thurman).
43. Id. at 788 (Rep. Kerr).
44. Id.
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liability in any form. There was no agency relationship between the
wrongdoers and the municipality. Indeed, the municipality's liability
was completely independent of any relationship or connection it might
have had with the tortfeasors. Senator John Stevenson of Kentucky
made this precise point in distinguishing the theory of liability in the
first conference substitute with the rules of liability relating to corporations. Asserting that corporations, including municipal corporations,
were liable for personal injuries in the same way that individuals were
liable, he declared that:
[A]s a general rule a corporation is not responsible for the unauthorized and unlawful
acts of its officers, although done under the color of their office; to render it liable
it must appear that it expressly authorized the acts to be done by them, or that they
were done in pursuance of a general authority to act for the corporation on the subject
to which they relate.45

He complained that the Sherman Amendment, for the first time, created "a corporate liability for personal injury which no prudence or
foresight could have prevented. '46 Stevenson thus objected to the provision because it departed from traditional corporate tort principles of
liability based on fault and vicarious liability. This criticism is supported by the language of the Sherman Amendment, particularly when
it is understood in the context of this legislative history.
Consequently, Monell was simply incorrect in suggesting that the
framers refused to impose vicarious liability on municipalities because
the first conference substitute contained elements of vicarious liability
which Congress rejected. 47 The error the Court made here is that it
45. Id. at 762 (Sen. Stevenson).
46. Id. Curiously, the Court in Moneil interpreted the Sherman Amendment as
incorporating this principle of absolute liability as a theory of vicarious liability. 436
U.S. at 692 n.57. The Court declared that:
[W]hether intended or not, the amendment as drafted did impose a species of vicarious liability on municipalities since it could be construed to impose liability even
if a municipality did not know of an impending or ensuing riot or did not have the
wherewithal to do anything about it. Indeed, the amendment held a municipality
liable even it had done everything in its power to curb the riot.
Id.
47. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57. The Court opined that:
[I]t is plain from the text of the second conference substitute-which limited liability
to those who, having the power to intervene against Ku Klux Klan violence, 'neglected or refuse[d] so to do,' . . . that Congress also rejected those elements of
vicarious liability contained in the first conference substitute even while accepting
the basic principle that the inhabitants of a community were bound to provide protection against the Ku Klux Klan. Strictly speaking, of course, the fact that Congress
refused to impose vicarious liability for the wrongs of a few private citizens does
not conclusively establish that it would similarly have refused to impose vicarious
liability for the torts of a municipality's employees. Nonetheless, when Congress'
rejection of the only form of vicarious liability presented to it is combined with the
absence of any language in § 1983 which can easily be construed to create respondeat
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incorrectly characterized the municipality's liability as grounded on
"the wrongs of a few private citizens" of the municipality and equated
these wrongs to those that might have been committed by the municipality's employees. Clearly, under the Sherman Amendment, it was not
that the wrongdoers were citizens of the municipality that gave rise to
the municipality's liability and, ultimately, to that of its property owners. The wrongdoers need not have been residents or have had any
relationship to the municipality. Rather, municipal liability was predicated on the mere fact that the wrongs were committed within the
municipality.
It appears that the Court fatally erred in Monroe4 8 and Monell when
it based its interpretations of municipal liability under § 1983 on the
debates relating to the Sherman Amendment. The nature of municipal
liability under the Sherman Amendment was entirely different from
that of § 1983. Section 1983 imposes liability on persons acting under
color of law for their own violations of civil rights. In contrast, the
Sherman Amendment, in all of its versions, imposed liability for failing
to protect individualsfrom civil rights violations committed by others.4 9
Unlike § 1983, the Sherman Amendment imposed an affirmative duty
to protect individuals from the wrongdoing of others, whereas § 1983
imposes an affirmative duty of care not to violate the constitutional
rights of individuals.
III. Theories of Constitutional Authority to Enact the
Sherman Amendment
Debates relating to Congress' authority to enact the 1871 Act, including
the Sherman Amendment, reflect the differences between § 1983, on
the one hand, and the Sherman Amendment on the other. Theories of
superior liability, the inference that Congress did not intend to impose such liability

is quite strong.

Id.

48. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
49. But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989), where the Court held that § 1983 does not impose an affirmative duty to protect.
The Court's holding was based on its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, which it declared does not require
the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by
private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not
as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security It forbids the State
itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without "due process of law,"
but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the
State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means. Nor
does history support such an expansive reading of the constitutional text.
Id. at 195.
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constitutional authority advanced by the bill's supporters included the
power to impose liability on municipalities for the violations of constitutional rights committed by their own officials. The bill's floor managers in both the House and the Senate interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment as conferring fundamental rights on all citizens and inhabitants of the United States, and concluded that these fundamental
rights included the right to the due process of law and the right to the
equal protection of their person and property by both the national and
state governments. These Fourteenth Amendment rights imposed a corresponding duty on both the national and state governments to enforce
these rights and to protect every person in their enjoyment of them.
These constitutionally secured rights delegated to Congress the power
to enforce them by appropriate legislation.50 In addition, section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment expressly delegated this enforcement
power to Congress. Supporters of the 1871 Act in both Houses of Congress thus interpreted the Constitution as imposing a duty on the United
States and on the individual states to protect the fundamental rights of
their inhabitants.
Theories of Congress' power to enforce fundamental rights directly
against the violators of these rights were expressed more in the debates
relating to the first two sections of the 1871 bill than those relating to
the Sherman Amendment, for obvious reasons. 5 1 These sections of the
bill provided for the enforcement of civil rights and equal protection
directly, by providing civil remedies and criminal penalties against
those who violated an individual's fundamental rights. The Sherman
Amendment, on the other hand, provided for the enforcement of fundamental rights indirectly, by providing civil remedies against local
communities and private individuals who failed to protect an individual's fundamental rights from the violations of others. Consequently,
the Sherman Amendment debates focused more on Congress' authority
to impress the states and local communities into performing their constitutional duties to protect the personal safety and property of their
inhabitants.
Proponents insisted that Congress could enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights in different ways. It could enforce them directly by impos50. For constitutional arguments in support of §§ 1 and 2 of the 1871 bill, see
42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 67-70 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 8186 (Rep. Bingham); id. at 206-210 (Rep. James Blair of Missouri); CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 333 (Rep. Hoar); id. at 339 (Rep. Kelley); id. at 375-376 (Rep. Lowe);
id. at 389-392 (Rep. Elliot); id. at 566-569, 578-579, 691-700 (Sen. Edmunds); id. at
576-578 (Sen. Carpenter); id. at 604-609 (Sen. Pool); id. at 650-651 (Sen. Sumner);
id. at 653-656 (Sen. Osborn).
51. See the arguments cited supra note 48.
CONG. GLOBE,
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ing criminal sanctions and civil remedies against anyone, private individuals and public officials, who violated them, as Congress did in
the first two sections of the 1871 bill. It is on this theory, in part, that
Congress enacted these provisions.52 Congress could also enforce these
rights when a state failed to protect them, or if a state violated them in
some way. According to proponents, if a state failed to perform its
Fourteenth Amendment duty to secure its inhabitants in their constitutional rights, particularly the equal protection of the law, or if a state
affirmatively violated these rights, Congress had two options. In such
cases, the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the U.S. government to
enforce the rights directly by going into the state and providing the
protection that the state denied.5 3 Alternatively, the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the United States to enforce the duty the Constitution
imposed on the state to protect its inhabitants by requiring the state to
perform its duty. So, Congress could enforce Fourteenth Amendment
rights and discharge its duty to enforce them in two ways: directly, by
providing the requisite protection, or indirectly, by requiring the states
to perform their duty to protect. 54 Proponents thus interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as requiring the United States and the states themselves to secure these rights and as delegating authority to Congress to
protect substantive rights directly and indirectly, by requiring the states
to perform their duty to protect substantive rights.
The House and Senate Floor Managers of the 1871 bill also argued
that Congress had the authority to impress municipalities into protecting constitutional rights and to impose on them civil liability for the
violation of constitutional rights by "riotous assemblages." However,
they offered different theories of congressional authority. Congressman
Samuel Shellabarger insisted that Congress had the same power to coerce municipalities to safeguard their inhabitants as it had to coerce
individuals to ensure that federal laws are not flagrantly defied. He
stated that Congress had the power to
coerce a county of a State, touching a subject-matter over which the United States
has power to coerce every person in that county, to wit: touching there being or not
being mobs in such county, kept up and perpetuated to defy the laws of the United
States and destroy the rights secured by these laws.5"

Shellabarger reasoned:
52. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 751 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 756
(Sen. Edmunds).
53. Id. (Rep. Shellabarger)
54. Id. at 751, 756 (Rep. Shellabarger and Sen. Edmunds).
55. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 751 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger).
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[I]f the United States may impose on a body of the people the obligation to see to
it that the United States laws are not riotously defied to the damage of the people
in a particular district, and may make the inhabitants of such prescribed district
liable if they neglect said duty, then, as a matter of convenience, the United States
may just as well designate the district and inhabitants so made liable by the name
of a county as by any other method of designation or description, and having made
them, as such liable to have a valid judgment against them by their corporate name,
and they being, under well-recognized United States law, a person in the courts,
it is perfectly competent to enforce a judgment for such a liability in the same
manner as could
any other judgment be enforced against the same legal person or
56
corporation.

Shellabarger seemed to disregard the corporate nature of a municipality
as a distinct entity and insisted that Congress' power to act on a municipal corporation derived from its constitutional power to act directly
on the people who comprise the municipality.
In addition, Shellabarger cited to Supreme Court decisions that established the jurisdiction of the federal courts over corporations generally, and municipal corporations specifically, and the power of federal
courts to execute judgments against municipalities under the same process as that provided in the Sherman Amendment.5 7 Shellabarger asserted that under Article III, § 2, which defines the judicial power of
the United States,
counties, cities, and corporations of all sorts, after years of judicial conflict, have
become thoroughly established to be an individual or person or entity of the personal
existence, of which, as a citizen, individual, or inhabitant, the United States Constitution does take note and endow with faculty to sue and be sued in the courts of the
United States.5 8

Shellabarger then insisted that Congress has the same authority "to
authorize a judgment for a tort to be rendered under Federal law against
any municipal corporation," as it has to authorize a civil action in tort
59
against an individual.
56. Id. at 752
57. The cases Rep. Shellabarger cited were Knox County v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 376 (1860), and Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson,
43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). He also referred to Contract Clause cases that had recently
been decided which asserted federal jurisdiction over and judicial authority to execute
judgments against municipalities. Monell referred to Shellabarger's citation to these
cases in support of his argument that the United States could impose on municipalities
an obligation to keep the peace. Monell, 436 U.S. at 673 n.8. However, the Court did
not explain Shellabarger's theory of constitutional authority in its holding. See id. at
673, 688 n.50.
58. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 752 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger). Monell
also quoted this statement to establish that "by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional
and statutory analysis;" that this principle was extended to municipal corporations; that
"municipal corporations were routinely sued in the federal courts and this fact was well
known to Members of Congress." Monell, 436 U.S. at 687-688 (citations omitted).
59. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 752 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger).
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Senator George Edmunds offered a different theory of congressional
authority over municipalities. He emphasized the duty the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes on the states to provide to all of their inhabitants
the equal protection of the laws. This duty devolves to every city,
county, and parish in the country, as subdivisions of the states, Senator
Edmunds reasoned, because the states entrusted these local governments with the local administration of justice and with the preservation
of the peace. Since the Fourteenth Amendment duty to secure to persons the equal protection of the law requires the states to preserve
individuals from riot and tumult, this duty flows through to the municipality. Congress may enforce this duty against municipalities by
imposing civil liability on them when they fail to protect. Senator Edmunds concluded: "[When,] therefore, they [the municipality] fail to
perform the duty of protection, which the theory of this law implies
that they are bound to perform, against tumult and riot, then the Constitution has declared that Congress, by appropriate legislation, may
apply to them the duty of making reimbursement." 6
IV. Constitutional Theories of Opponents of the
Sherman Amendment
Although opposition to the Sherman Amendment was fierce, Monell
concluded that "This debate shows conclusively that the constitutional
objections raised against the Sherman amendment---on which our holding in Monroe was based, ....
would not have prohibited congressional
creation of a civil remedy against state municipal corporations that
infringed federal rights.' '6' Monell asserted that those who opposed the
Sherman Amendment did so because municipalities "were not obligated to keep the peace at state law" 62 and "the Federal government
could not constitutionally require local governments to create police
forces, whether this requirement was levied directly, or indirectly by
imposing damages for breach of the peace on municipalities. '63 In an
astonishing recognition of extraordinary congressional civil rights enforcement authority, the Court asserted that even opponents did not
doubt "that the Federal Government could impose on the States the
obligation imposed by the Sherman amendment, and presumably [they]
60. Id. at 756 (Sen. Edmunds). Representative Horace Smith of New York argued
essentially the same theory of congressional power. Id. at 799 (Rep. Smith of New
York).
61. Monell, 436 U.S. at 669.
62. Id. at 673.
63. Id.
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would have enforced the amendment against a municipal corporation
to which the peacekeeping obligation had been delegated" by the
state. 64 Monell appears to attribute to the opposition a theory of constitutional authority to impose civil liability on municipalities for failing
to perform their constitutional duty to protect that was actually asserted
by some proponents!
There are several problems with Monell's interpretation of the opposition's argument. First, the Court treats the opposition as if its position was monolithic, that is, that opponents expressed one view or
theory of Congress' legislative authority.65 Actually, there were several
opposition theories. Second, Moneil identified only five representatives
who allegedly made the argument the Court identifies as the opposition
argument, all of whom were Republicans and all but one of whom
supported all of the other provisions of the 1871 bill. 66 The Court completely ignored other constitutional objections raised by the "real" opponents of the 1871 Act, House and Senate Democrats.
It appears that Monell misinterpreted the objections voiced by the
five House Republican opponents the Court discussed. Only one, possibly two, of these representatives espoused the theory Monell attributed to the opposition. 67 The other three Republican opponents objected
64. Id. at 673 n.30. The Court's interpretation of the opposition is astonishing in
light of its subsequent decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189 (1989), where it held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not impose a
duty to protect on the states. The specific holding in DeShaney is that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not impose a duty on child welfare workers
to protect a four year old boy from his father's physical abuse, some of which abuse
the social workers were aware. See supra note 47.
65. The Court did identify differences in nuance. For example, it noted that although Representative Willard shared the House opposition view, he "also took a somewhat different position," namely, that the Constitution did "not allow the Federal Government to dictate the manner in which a State fulfilled its obligation of protection."
Monell, 436 U.S. at 673 n.30. It also noted that Willard did not doubt that Congress
could enforce the duty to protect against a municipality to which the state had delegated
the peacekeeping obligation. Id. The Court also noted that Senate opponents shared the
House opposition view, but that "Senate opponents focused not on the [Sherman]
amendment's attempt to obligate municipalities to keep the peace, but on the lien
created by the amendment, which ran against all money and property of a defendant
municipality." Id. However, the Court dismissed the Senate opposition as "not relevant
to an analysis of the constitutionality of [§ 1983] since any judgment under that section,
as in any civil suit in the federal courts in 1871, would have been enforced pursuant
to state laws under the Process Acts of 1792 and 1828." Id.
66. Monell relies on the arguments of Representatives Austin Blair of Michigan,
Charles Willard of Vermont, Luke Poland of Vermont, Horatio Burchard of Illinois,
and John Farnsworth of Illinois, all of whom were Republicans who voted for the 1871
bill before the Sherman Amendment was added, and who, with the exception of Farnsworth, voted for the bill as amended by the second conference substitute. CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1871); id. at 808. See Monel, 436 U.S. at 673 n.30.
67. The Court identified Representative Austin Blair as having made "[tihe most
complete statement of this position." Monell, 436 U.S. at 673. It was not only the most
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that, inasmuch as municipalities derived their existence and powers
from the state, the federal government had "no power either to create
or destroy [municipalities], and no power or control over [municipalities] whatever. ' 6 Representative Charles Willard of Vermont, asserting
that he was not addressing Congress' constitutional powers but was
merely discussing the "justice" of making municipalities liable for failing to protect their inhabitants, maintained that the Constitution has not
imposed upon municipalities the duty "to provide protection for the
people, to give them equal rights, privileges, and immunities." Rather,
"[t]he Constitution has declared that to be the duty of the State... and
I understand... that [duty] applies only to the States, so far as political
or municipal action is concerned.'69 Like Willard, Representative Luke
Poland, also from Vermont, based his theory of opposition on the fact
that
[c]ounties and towns are subdivisions of the State government, and exercise in a
limited sphere and extent, the powers of the State delegated to them; they are created
by the State for the purpose of carrying out the laws and policy of the State, and are
subject only to such duties and liabilities as State laws impose upon them."70

Poland insisted, therefore, that Congress had no constitutional power
over municipalities. Representative John Farnsworth of Illinois went
even further and adopted the Democrats' constitutional position, insisting that Congress did not have any authority over state officials, let
alone municipal officers and municipalities. 7' He broke ranks with fellow Republicans and denied that Congress had constitutional authority
to enact any of the provisions of the 1871 Act, because the Fourteenth
Amendment only authorized Congress "to correct unequal and partial
legislation of a State. '72 Moreover, other House and Senate Republicans
complete statement of this position, it was the only unambiguous statement of this
position. However, statements of Representative Horatio Burchard reasonably can be
construed as adopting Blair's position.
68. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 794 (1871) (Rep. Poland).
69. Id. at 791 (Rep. Willard) (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 794 (Rep. Poland).
71. Id. at 799 (Rep. Farnsworth).
72. Farnsworth stated:
It is claimed that the concluding clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which says
that "Congress shall have power to enforce the provisions of the amendment by
appropriate legislation," gives authority for this bill. I deny it, sir. The first section
of the amendment requires no legislation; "it is a law unto itself;" and the courts can
execute it. If it requires "enforcing" legislation, what kind does it require?
[T]he only "legislation" we can do is to "enforce" the provisions of the Con[..
stitution upon the laws of the State.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 117 (1871) (Rep. Farnsworth). Farnsworth
clarified what he meant by this in an exchange with Representative Bingham. Farnsworth insisted that Congress only has "the power to correct unequal and partial legislation of a State." Id. at 86 (Rep. Farnsworth). This was the constitutional position that
Democrats asserted in both Houses of Congress.
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who opposed the Sherman Amendment did so because they believed
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to impose civil liability on
municipalities.

73

Monell's discussion of the constitutional position of the opposition
is fatally flawed because it completely ignored the constitutional objections of the House Democrats. Indeed, Monell incorrectly attributed
to them and to Senate Democrats its erroneous conception of the views
of House Republican opponents of the Sherman Amendment. Contrary
to the Court's assertion that opponents did not doubt that the federal
government could impose on the states the duty to protect, and those
municipalities to which states had delegated this duty, Democrats denied that Congress had any power to act against the states or their
subdivisions in any manner, including the attempted imposition of civil
liability on municipalities for failure to perform police functions. Representative Michael Kerr, the House Minority Leader, led the opposition
with this argument, basing it on a theory of dual sovereignty that conceives of the national and state governments as separate, distinct, and
mutually autonomous sovereignties, whose powers are mutually exclusive. 74 Kerr opined that Congress could not interfere with the states'
73. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 798 (1871) (Rep. Bingham); id.
at 777 (Sen.Frelinghuysen) (emphasis added).
74. Monel asserted that "the doctrine of dual sovereignty apparently put no limit
on the power of federal courts to enforce the Constitution against municipalities that
violated it." See Monell, 436 U.S. at 680. The Court reasoned that so long as federal
courts "were vindicating the Federal Constitution, they were providing the 'positive'
government action required to protect federal constitutional rights [sic] and no question
was raised of enlisting the States in 'positive action."' It noted that the Supreme Court
"vigorously enforced the Contract Clause against municipalities" on the very day it
decided Collector v. Day, U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871). Opponents of the Sherman
Amendment distinguished this case from the first conference substitute on the grounds
that the Court in the Contract Clause cases was merely enforcing a contractual duty
the state authorized the municipality to incur, and in freely entering the contract the
municipality was consenting to be sued. The Court insisted that imposing civil liability
for a constitutional tort was an unconstitutional invasion of state sovereignty. The
analog to the Contract Clause cases, however, would be a suit based on state tort law
that could be filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The Contract Clause
analog to the first conference substitute would be a federal statute requiring a municipality to honor its contract obligations and conferring a cause of action in the federal
courts to enforce the contract against the municipality should it fail to do so. From the
perspective of the Democratic opponents of the first conference substitute, Monell, in
my view, is simply wrong in asserting that:
Since § 1 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1871] simply conferred jurisdiction on the
federal courts to enforce § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-a situation precisely
analogous to the grant of diversity jurisdiction under which the Contract Clause was
enforced against municipalities [-] is no reason to suppose that opponents of the
Sherman amendment would have found any constitutional barrier to § 1 suits against
municipalities.
436 U.S. at 681-82.
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police powers because these powers are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.75 He declared:
I hold that the constitutional power of the Federal Government to punish the citizens
of the United States for any offenses punishable by it at all may be exercised and
exhausted against the individual offender and his property; but when you go one
inch beyond that you are compelled, by the very necessities which surround you, to
invade powers which are secured to the States, which are a necessary and most
essential part of the autonomy of the State governments, without which there can
logically be no State government. For it must be remembered that if you can impose
these penalties at all upon the counties, parishes, or cities, and can invade their
treasuries or control their ministerial officers to any extent whatever, your power is
unlimited, it may go to any extent you please, it may take the entire control of all
these officers of the State governments, and thus practically and substantially break
down those governments, putting everything and everybody
under the sovereign will
76
and pleasure of the Congress of the United States.

With a touch of irony, Kerr cited the great national supremacist, Chief
Justice John Marshall, as the source of his constitutional theory and
insisted that any means or any instrumentalities that Congress elects to
carry out its delegated powers "become the exclusive instruments of
the Federal Government; that the power of the Federal Government
over them is above all other control. ' '77 That is why, in Kerr's view:
"The power of the Federal Government must be exclusive. The power
of the State government within its limits, and as to the reserved powers
of the States, must be exclusive, and in an important sense sovereign."
This was the very basis for Kerr's opposition to the Sherman Amendment substitute. It invaded the state's police powers, "which are a necessary and most essential part of the autonomy of State governments,
without which there can logically be no State government. 78 In the
Democrats' view, the Sherman Amendment, indeed the entire 1871 bill,
threatened the very survival of American federalism.
In addition to insisting that Congress could not enforce constitutional
rights against the states, Democrats also insisted that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not delegate legislative authority to Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's § 1 at all. The clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment's first section, Representative Kerr asserted, were
"simply declaratory of the preexisting law of the country, the preexisting, fundamental, constitutional law declared by all the courts and tri75. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1871) (Rep. Kerr).
76. Id. This argument was the obverse of Justice Joseph Story's reasoning in Prigg
v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), explaining why the states did not have
the constitutional power to enforce the right of slave holders under the Fugitive Slave
Clause: the power to enforce the right was the power to impede its exercise and even
to destroy the right.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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bunals of the entire country."7 9 They did not require enforcement
through legislation. If any state should violate their provisions, the "sufficient remedy" is placed where it has always been found, "in the ju8' 0
diciary of the States and of the Union.
V. Policy Objections to the Sherman Amendment
In addition to the constitutional objections to the Sherman Amendment,
there were also a number of objections based on policy grounds. Legislators objected to imposing strict liability on inhabitants and municipalities for the wrongful actions of strangers.8 1 Some objected that it
was unjust to impose liability on municipalities when Congress did not
have authority to empower them to perform the duty to protect for
which the Sherman Amendment made them liable.8 2 Others thought
that it was foolish to shift the cost of riots to municipalities to induce
them to oppose mob violence and then to authorize them to recover
those costs from the wrongdoers, thus removing the intended incentive.8 3 Representative Poland identified another weakness in the bill.

79. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 47-48 (1871) (Rep. Kerr). Accord
id. at 87 (Rep. Storm).
80. Id. at 48 (Rep. Kerr). Representative Washington Whitthorne of Tennessee, a
member of the House committee that reported the 1871 bill, insisted that § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which delegated power to Congress to enforce the provisions
of the amendment, "applies not to the first section, but to the second, third, and fourth
sections." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 338 (1871) (Rep. Whitthorne). Democrats also raised other objections to § 1 and the other sections of the 1871 Act and
Congress' power to enact them. For example, Senator J. W. Johnston of Virginia argued
that § 1 was unconstitutional because Congress is limited to the jurisdiction the Constitution confers on federal courts as defined by Article Il of the Constitution. He
insisted that § 1 of the 1871 Act "proposes to allow citizens of the same State, or of
the same county, to sue one another in the courts of the United States. I hold that to
be plainly unconstitutional." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 215 (1871) (Sen.
Johnston of Virginia). Senator John Stockton of New Jersey insisted that there was no
constitutional power to enact the 1871 Act, for the power to pass this bill would encompass the power to interfere with the Bill of Rights. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 572 (1871).
81. See supra notes 37-43 and the accompanying text.
82. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 791 (1871) (Rep. Willard).
83. Representative Poland insisted this disincentive was among many substantial
weaknesses in the first conference substitute. He observed that, on the one hand, the
measure was intended to insure that municipalities would prevent mob action and
injuries resulting from them by shifting the cost of these injuries onto the municipalities
and their inhabitants. On the other hand, to meet objections made in the House, the
Conference Committee amended the original Sherman Amendment to protect municipalities from absorbing these costs by giving them an action over against the wrongdoers to make them whole. This contradiction between the theory of the first conference
substitute and what it actually provided, Poland insisted, "detracts very largely from
the spirit of restraining grace, as I term it." He characterized this provision as "foolish,
absurd, and of no utility." Id. at 793 (Rep. Poland).
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He noted that the reason for imposing liability on the municipality was
that the victim of these outrages could not identify the persons who
committed them, so that it was impossible to maintain a suit against
the wrongdoers. To maintain a suit at all, however, the claimant must
prove that the act was committed with the intent to deprive him of a
constitutional right. Poland queried how the claimant could provide
proof of this intent if he did not know who committed the outrage. He
further asked how the victim could bring a suit against the municipality
if he could not bring a suit against the wrongdoers themselves. Poland,
therefore, thought that the substitute was useless. 4
These policy objections offered sufficient reasons, independent of
any constitutional considerations, for opposing the first conference substitute, which alone imposed municipal liability. Voting patterns suggest
that House Republican opposition to the first conference substitute was
based on reasons other than constitutional grounds. House Republicans
overwhelmingly opposed the original Sherman Amendment, which imposed strict liability on a municipality's inhabitants for rights violations
inflicted by others. s5 However, a substantial majority of House Republicans voted for the first conference substitute.8 6 Moreover, only six
House Republicans voted against the bill as amended with the second
conference substitute.17 The amended bill differed from the original
Sherman Amendment in changing the standard of liability to fault. Consequently, the strict liability of the first two versions seems to have been
a significant factor in the Republicans' opposition to them.

84. Id. at 793 (Rep. Poland).
85. House Republicans overwhelmingly supported the 1871 bill before the Sherman Amendment: 117 yea, 5 nay, 12 absent, 2 not voting. House Republicans rejected
Sherman's original amendment by the overwhelming vote of 42 yea, 60 nay, 34 absent.
A substantial majority of House Republicans actually voted for the first conference
substitute: 74 yea, 34 nay, 28 absent. Although House Republicans voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Bill as amended with the second conference substitute (92 yea, 6
nay, 38 absent), support was not nearly as great as it was before it was amended. Voting
patterns in the Senate were similar. The 1871 bill before it was amended was approved:
44 yea, 18 nay, 6 absent. The bill with the first conference substitute was approved:
32 yea, 16 nay, 21 absent. The Senate approved the bill as amended by the second
conference substitute: 36 yea, 13 nay, 21 absent.
86. Professor Beermann argues for related reasons that the rejection of the Sherman
Amendment is "not ... strong evidence for rejecting municipal liability generally and
vicarious municipal liability in particular." Beermann, supra note 21, at 8. He notes
that the Amendment's rejection "was not, as the [Monell] Court has claimed, particularly resounding. In fact, two versions of the Amendment passed in the Senate, and at
least one was agreed to by a conference committee, indicating some support for it even
in the House. Thus, no broad conclusions regarding municipal liability should be drawn
from the rejection of the Sherman Amendment." Id. at 8-9.
87. Thirty-six House Republicans were absent from the vote.
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VI. The Sherman Amendment Debates and Municipal
Liability
Although Monell's analysis of the Sherman Amendment debates is
flawed, the Court's conclusion that these debates do not preclude municipal liability under § 1983 is essentially sound. Unlike § 1983, the
Sherman Amendment did not involve municipal liability for its own
violations of constitutional rights. Rather, it purported to impose civil
liability on municipalities for their failure to protect against certain
rights violations committed by others. Rejecting municipal liability for
the failure to protect is not the equivalent to rejecting municipal liability
for its own rights violations. 88 Consequently, the Sherman Amendment
debates do not provide conclusive evidence whether the supporters of
the Sherman Amendment intended to impose municipal liability under
§ 1983. No one addressed the question of municipal liability in the
debates relating to section 1 of the 1871 Act, the precursor of § 1983.
No inference can be made from these debates on either side of the issue.
Consequently, the legislative history of § 1983 does not resolve the
question of whether the framers intended it to make municipalities liable for their own violations of constitutional rights.
VII. The Sherman Amendment Debates and Municipal
Vicarious Liability
Monell's holding, "that Congress did not intend municipalities to be
held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort," 89 is untenable. Both Monell and
Monroe acknowledged that supporters of § 1983 intended to provide
broad remedies to redress rights violations resulting from the failure to
enforce the law, or the inaction of public officials, as well as from
actions pursuant to official rules and policies. The conditions in the
South that Congress was attempting to remedy confirm this view.90 It
was not racially discriminatory laws and policies that presented the
greatest concern to Congress in 1871. Rather, it was the inaction of law
enforcement officers, the complicity of public officials in criminal
wrongdoing, and the failure of the states' civil and criminal justice
systems to protect against and to redress rights violations that Congress
was attempting to address. In other words, Congress was attempting to
88. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 21; Fisher, supra note 31.
89. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
90. See TRELEASE, supra note 13. This history evinces the pervasive failure of

local authorities to protect Americans in the South from Klan violence.
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remedy rights violations where local authorities failed to protect civil
rights, as well as violations resulting from actions taken by public officials in violation of official regulations, policies, and laws.
The record of debates relating to section 1 of the 1871 bill, the actual
precursor of § 1983, which Monell overlooked or ignored, is replete
with evidence showing that its supporters intended to redress rights
violations resulting from public officers acting, or failing to act, in
violation of state law and official policies and regulations, as well as
pursuant to them. Representative William Stoughton of Michigan emphasized the condition of lawlessness in the South, declaring that:
"There is no security for life, person, or property. The State authorities
and local courts are unable or unwilling to check the evil or punish the
criminals." 91 Representative Austin Blair, also of Michigan, noted that:
"In many instances [the criminals] are the State authorities." Representative David Lowe of Kansas was more graphic in describing the need
for federal legislation:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and
banishment have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective
....If there is no remedy for this, if the rights of citizenship may be denied without
redress, if the Constitution may not be enforced, if life and liberty may not be
effectively protected, then, indeed, is our civil Government a failure. 92

The supporters of § 1983 clearly intended it to apply to public officers who infringed constitutional rights in violation of official regulations, policies, and laws. They understood the need for congressional
protection of constitutional rights as stemming from such rights violations, more than from violations committed by actions pursuant to
official regulations, policies, and laws. Representative James Garfield
of Ohio, for example, stated that
the chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal, but that even where
the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of
them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are
denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state of facts is clearly made
out, I believe the last clause of the first section [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
provide for doing justice to those persons who
empowers Congress to step in and
93
are thus denied equal protection.
91. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1871) (Rep. Stoughton).
92. Id. at 374 (Rep. Lowe). See also id. at 332 (Rep. George F. Hoar); id. at 369
(Rep. Monroe); CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 78 (1871) (Rep. Perry).
93. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 153 (1871) (Rep. Garfield). Monell
quoted Garfield's statement, in part. Monell, 436 U.S. at 686 n.45. The Court, however,
failed to include that portion of Garfield's statement that asserted that § 1 of the 1871
Act applied even when the laws are just and equal rights are violated, which implied
Garfield's belief that § 1 was intended to apply to officials even when they were not
acting pursuant to official policies, regulations, and ordinances.
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Representative Lowe made a similar argument, stating that if the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment were limited to the infringement of citizens's rights by state law and by acts pursuant to state laws,
then
all rights may be subverted and denied, without color of law, and the Federal Government have no power to interfere. All you have to do, therefore, under this view,
to drive every obnoxious man from a State, or slay him with impunity, is to have
the law all right on the statute-book, but quietly permit rapine and violence to take
their way, without the hinderance [sic] of local authorities. Such a position, Mr.
Speaker, defeats itself by its own absurdities. The rights and privileges of citizens
94
are not only not to be denied by a State, but they are not to be deprived of them.

There is no principled way to interpret § 1983 as applying liability
to public officers who infringed constitutional rights in violation of
official regulations, policies, and laws, and still maintain that municipal
liability under § 1983 was restricted only to rights infringements committed by actions pursuant to official regulations, policies, and laws. In
my view, Monell's conclusion that supporters of § 1983 intended to
hold municipalities liable, but rejected vicarious liability for municipalities, is untenable.
Republicans unquestionably expected section 1 liability to include
state and local officials. 95 In addition to the framers' statements expressing this expectation, this conclusion is supported by the enactment
in the preceding year, by many of the same legislators, of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870.96 This legislation was enacted under a
comparable constitutional theory of rights enforcement, which provided
comparable remedies to the 1871 Act.97 Section one of the 1870 Act
declared that all U.S. citizens who were otherwise qualified to vote had
a federal right to vote without distinction of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude in any election in a "State, Territory, district,
county, city, parish, township, school district municipality, or other territorial subdivision. 9 8 Section two imposed a federal duty on all "persons or officers" who are charged by the state with the performance of
duties in furnishing to citizens an opportunity to perform any prerequisite or to satisfy any qualification for voting. The statute required
these "persons or officers" to provide "the same and equal opportunity
to perform such prerequisite, and to become qualified to vote without
94. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1871) (Rep. Lowe) (emphasis added).
95. The Supreme Court's decision in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58 (1989), is thus contradicted by the evidence discussed here.
96. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, § 1 (1870).
97. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. at 209 (1871) (comments of Rep.
Blair of Missouri).
98. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, § 1 (1870).
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distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 99 It gave
anyone denied this equal opportunity to become qualified to vote a tort
action for statutory damages of $500 against the person or officer who
refused or knowingly omitted to perform this state and federal duty.
Section 3 provided that any otherwise qualified voter who was denied
the opportunity to perform any prerequisite or qualification to vote was
to be deemed qualified, and his vote was to be counted. It provided that
"any judge, inspector, or other officer of election whose duty it is or
shall be" to count and certify this vote and who wrongfully refused or
omitted to receive and give effect to the vote of such person, shall be
liable in tort for statutory damages of $500 for each offense to the
person aggrieved. 100
These provisions, enacted to enforce the right secured under the Fifteenth Amendment, are equivalent to section 1 of the 1871 Act, enacted
to secure the rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Enforcement Act of 1870 explicitly imposed a federal duty on state and local officers of election, and other "persons," to
perform the duties imposed on them by state law in state as well as
federal elections. It also imposed liability on these public officials and
persons for failing to perform these federal and state duties, and conferred on individuals who were "aggrieved" by the failure to perform
these duties, a civil cause of action for statutory damages of $500. No
federal judge who considered the constitutionality of these provisions
held that any of them unconstitutionally imposed federal duties and
liability on state and local officials for failing to perform their duties
under state law and the 1870 statute. 10 '
It is reasonable to suppose that the supporters of section 1 of the
1871 Act contemplated its application to the same variety of public
officials, because it was the Fourteenth Amendment analog to the 1870
Act. The evidence is overwhelming that the supporters of § 1983 intended to provide protection against and remedies for rights violations
caused by the failure of public officers to perform their public duties,
by the actions of public officers that violated official policies, regula99. Id. § 2.
100. Id. § 3.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324 (C.C. Del. 1873) (No.
15,210); United States v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1328 (C.C. Del. 1873) (No. 15,211). The
Supreme Court struck down §§ 3 and 4, but not because they imposed liability against
state election officers for failing to perform their federal and state duties. The Court
did not challenge this aspect of these provisions. Rather, the Court struck them down
because they could have applied to private persons who interfered with a citizen's
Fifteenth Amendment rights. The Court interpreted the Fifteenth Amendment as guaranteeing an immunity from racially motivated state infringements of otherwise qualified
voters' right to vote. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 219-21 (1875).
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tions, and laws, as well as the actions of public officers pursuant to
official policies, regulations, and laws. If the framers also intended to
hold municipal corporations liable for their own constitutional violations, as Monell held they did, then it is reasonable to assume that the
framers intended municipal liability to apply to the same kinds of constitutional violations that they applied to state and municipal agents and
officers, particularly since corporations can act only through their
agents and officers. Consequently, municipal corporations would have
been liable for constitutional violations resulting from the actions of
their agents or officers who failed to enforce or violated official policies,
regulations, and laws, in addition to actions pursuant to official policies,
regulations, and laws.
There is no reason to suppose that the liability of municipalities and
their municipal officers under section 1 of the 1870 Act was intended
to be any different than it was under the law of municipal corporations
at that time. Under this law, the state had the power by statute to impose
liability on municipal corporations and their agents and officers where
they were not liable under the common law 0 2 Under the common law,
municipalities probably were not liable for the kinds of rights violations
Congress was attempting to remedy. Although they were often liable
for the misfeasance of their agents or officers, municipalities were not
liable for actions pursuant to their public functions or for the actions
of their police officers and firefighters.103 Nevertheless, if the framers
of § 1983 intended to hold municipal corporations liable for their constitutional violations, as Monell decided they did, and if Congress imposed civil liability on state and municipal officers for their violations
of constitutional rights when acting pursuant to official policies and
laws as well as in violation of them, as § 1983 clearly does, then it
would seem that nineteenth century rules of vicarious liability would
have rendered the municipal corporations vicariously liable for the constitutional violations of their employees. Consequently, the legislative
history of § 1983 not only does not preclude the imposition of vicarious
liability on municipalities, as Monell concluded, it may actually support it.
VIII. Conclusion
A careful review of the legislative history upon which the Supreme
Court relied in Monell evinces the following conclusions. The Court
102. JOHN F. DILLON, II THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(1873).
103. Id. §§ 764-71, 773-74.

§§ 760-63

MONELL'S ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

erred in assuming that the Sherman Amendment was the precursor of
§ 1983. Whereas § 1983 imposes liability on public officers and others
acting under color of law for constitutional rights violations they might
have committed themselves, the Sherman Amendment, in its various
formulations, imposed liability on municipalities or others for rights
violations committed by strangers. Because the Sherman Amendment
did not involve municipal liability for the municipality's own violations, it is not surprising that the Court in Monell concluded that "nothing said in debate on the Sherman Amendment would have prevented
holding a municipality liable under [§ 1983] for its own violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment. ''> 4 Nevertheless, the Court was also wrong
in this conclusion. The record of debates demonstrates that Democrats
uniformly, and some Republicans, expressed the view that Congress
lacked the constitutional authority to act on municipalities in any way.
Consequently, a closer examination of this record contradicts Monell's
conclusion that the legislative history "compels the conclusion that
Congress did intend municipalities and other local governments to be
included among those persons whom § 1983 applies."105 Although it
does not compel this conclusion, the legislative history also does not
preclude municipal liability under § 1983.
Monell also held that this legislative history "compels the conclusion" that Congress did not intend to impose liability on municipalities
"under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."' ° Nothing in the debates evinces an intent to shield municipalities from vicarious liability
for the constitutional violations of their employees. But then, nothing
in the debates evinces an intent to hold municipalities vicariously liable
for their agents' or officers' constitutional violations either. However,
if Monell was correct in holding that § 1983 was intended to impose
liability on municipalities for constitutional violations, and because §
1983 was intended to impose liability on municipal officers for constitutional violations resulting from their failure to perform and from their
violations of official policies and laws, Congress exposed municipalities to vicarious liability for the constitutional violations of their agents
and officers under rules of vicarious liability in force in 1871.

104. 436 U.S. at 683.

105. Id. at 690

106. Id. at 659, 691.

